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Between the Species
Towards a Coherent Theory
of
Animal Equality
ABSTRACT
In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an
ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory containing a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that
best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant
situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements.
I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and empathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that
both result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism.
Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care
principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic
right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that
can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads
to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value
of biodiversity.
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Introduction
In this article my ambitious goal is to construct a coherent
ethical system that is capable of dealing with all relevant issues
in principle-based animal ethics. The basic line of reasoning of
this construction goes as follows: I start with a factual property
of the world, which ignites a moral intuition or emotion, i.e. a
direct moral response or judgment that has no further rational
justification. Then, in a process of reflection, this intuition is
translated into a universalized ethical principle, where “universalized” means: “relevant to all morally similar situations.”
Sometimes different moral intuitions will mutually support
each other, resulting in a set of coherent universalized ethical
principles. But sometimes we encounter a new fact or situation
that again ignites another moral intuition or emotion, which
might be in contradiction with our constructed set of universalized ethical principles. To solve this conflict or moral dilemma,
we can either change the ethical principles, or introduce a new
ethical principle that trumps the previous ethical principles in
that particular situation. This new ethical principle needs to be
universalized as well to all relevantly similar situations.
This process continues: we again test the constructed coherent set of universalized principles in new situations, and if we
encounter a moral dilemma, we look for further refinements.
Eventually, all situations and all facts that ignite moral intuitions should be covered, and we move to a consistent ethical
system of hierarchical universalized principles, where some
principles trump others. In other words, we reach a theory in
“reflective equilibrium” (Rawls, 1971), which means that our
strongest moral intuitions and ethical principles are coherent
(mutually supporting each other).
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This approach can be compared with solving a crossword
puzzle. The descriptions of the words are the analogues of objective facts in the world. The white boxes refer to the possible
situations, the individual letters represent the intuitive moral
judgments in particular situations. The words correspond with
the universalized ethical principles (applied to all similar situations), and these words mutually support each other and form a
coherent solution to the puzzle. So let’s derive a coherent ethic
of animal equality, starting from the most basic, indisputable
objective facts and moral intuitions.

The construction of a coherent system
Fact 1: All sentient beings have a well-being and they value
their own well-being (and everything that contributes to wellbeing). Sentient beings are beings that have and can subjectively feel interests. Things subjectively matter to them, meaning
first of all that the individual has a mechanism (i.e. a complex
functioning nervous system) that enables the individual to have
representations of their bodies and environments. These representations can have intentionality, resulting in qualitative experiences (phenomenological sensations or qualia). For example:
through my fingers I can feel this book. I know the difference
between this feeling and an absence of feeling, for example
when my fingers are anaesthetized. However, just before I
paid attention to this feeling of touch, I was not aware of it.
There was an unconscious neural activity (but no anesthesia).
Only after I focused on my fingertips, it became a conscious
experience or “quale” of touch. Now, qualia are often neutral.
I don’t feel an urge to avoid touching books. But other qualia
are affective in nature; they are evaluated as being positive or
negative. A needle in my finger generates a quale that I wish to
avoid. This quale is called pain and it generates an urge in me.
Once a quale becomes an affective mental state (i.e. a positive
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or negative feeling or emotion such as pain, distress, joy,…),
well-being comes into play. These feelings are related to interests or needs: they are nothing but subjective experiences of
(un)satisfied interests. Fear, pain, and frustration indicate that
the needs for respectively safety, bodily integrity, and freedom
are not satisfied.
Moral intuition 1: Impartiality is morally important. We
can consider a two-step process to increase impartiality, from
rational egoism to extended contractualism. A rational egoist
would strive for a contractarian ethic (cf. Thomas Hobbes),
where all rational beings (i.e. beings with whom one can negotiate) of equal power will become part of the moral community,
because those rational egoists gain mutual advantages through
the social contract. However, in a first step to extend impartiality, Rawls (1971) used the method of the veil of ignorance to
delete the second condition of equality of power. He arrives at
a contractualist ethic that also includes rational people in dependent or weaker positions (minorities, future generations,...).
The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment, whereby you
imagine that you will be born as a rational agent, but you don’t
know who you will be. You can determine the moral and political laws, based on your knowledge of the natural laws. I
would suggest a second step to extend impartiality, whereby
we delete the condition of rationality. Imagine that you might
be any object or entity in the world, but you don’t know who
or what you might be. For complete impartiality, you have to
imagine you could be a planet, an electron, a pig in the year
3000 or anything you can think of. How would you like that entity to be treated? If you were non-sentient, this question would
not matter to you, because nothing done to you will influence
your well-being (you would not have a well-being). The kind
of treatment becomes important only for those beings whose
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well-being can be influenced by moral agents. Non-sentient entities should not be taken into account in this moral evaluation.
So the least arbitrary and most impartial thing to do is to delete
both conditions (of rationality and equality of power), which is
what Rowlands (1998) argued, from which it follows that wellbeing still remains important.
Universal ethical principle 1: All moral agents should
strive towards impartiality in all situations, and should take
everyone’s well-being into consideration in an impartial way.
Moral agents are people who are able to understand the notion
of impartiality.
Fact 2: Empathy is meaningful for all and only for sentient
beings (feeling empathy for non-sentient beings such as teddy
bears would be a kind of projection of emotions). Empathy is
the capacity to experience or sample the emotions of others.
This emotional response occurs when the perspective (frame of
reference) of the other is taken.
Moral intuition 2: Compassion (empathy plus the desire to
alleviate the suffering of the other) is a virtue.
Universal ethical principle 2: All moral agents should develop compassion in all situations (hence also towards all sentient beings). Moral agents are people who are able to develop
compassion, are able to understand the virtue of compassion,
and are able to help others. Those moral agents should try to
improve the well-being of others.
The above two universal ethical principles are coherent with
each other, and give a rational and emotional basis of the moral
importance of sentience. They are based on contractualism,
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. The coherence gets even
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stronger when we consider the following moral intuitions. A)
Mental capacities (self-consciousness, rationality,…) are morally important. They are very special, complex, and vulnerable,
hence worth protecting. B) Babies and mentally disabled humans have rights because they have something morally important. They have a higher moral status than human egg cells,
skin cells, dead human bodies, plants, or stones. Together with
the fact that sentience is the only mental capacity that mentally
disabled persons have in common with other humans, it follows from A and B that sentience is important. The link between rights and sentience is also not farfetched: rights protect
interests; feelings detect interests.
This gives us a strong coherent case for the moral relevance
of sentience. It is a scientific question (i.e. a matter of fact)
what entity has a well-being and how its well-being can be
influenced. We can briefly compare this moral relevance of
sentience with the moral irrelevance of a criterion such as the
species Homo sapiens. First, the species is one of the many biological classifications, thus it is arbitrary to pick a specific species and not a specific population, genus, family, order, class,…
Second, the definition of a species is very complicated. One
of the definitions refers to a set of individuals who could get
fertile offspring. But reference to fertility and offspring is very
artificial and farfetched when it comes to determining who has
rights. Third, science will never be able to determine whether a human-chimpanzee hybrid, a human-animal chimera, an
ancestor (Australopithecus, Homo habilis,…) or a genetically
modified humanoid should still be called Homo sapiens. The
boundaries are fuzzy. Fourth, all species are temporally related to all other species in a similar way, as populations can be
spatially related in a ring species (a ring species consists of a
spatial spreading of populations, where A can get fertile off-

© Between the Species, 2014

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 17, Issue 1

37
Stijn Bruers

spring with B, B with C, but C not with A). Fifth, if the moral
status of a species is determined by genes or bodily appearance,
then it is also very arbitrary to pick out those genes or bodily
characteristics and not others (such as skin color,…). We are
not responsible for our genes, so it would be a violation of the
desert principle if we based moral status on genes. In summary,
the species boundary is too arbitrary, artificial, and abstract to
be morally relevant.
So far, our ethic is not yet unambiguous and clear. We observe that there are different sentient beings, and multiple ways
to influence their well-being (for example: increasing everyone’s well-being a little bit versus increasing the well-being
of one individual a lot). So what is a just distribution of wellbeing? First of all, we value parsimony and simplicity. One
simple solution would be to add the levels of well-being of all
sentient beings for a specific time interval, and then take the
sum over all times. Then we could try to maximize this sum.
This is sum-utilitarianism. But there are also other simple options, such as trying to maximize the well-being of the worstoff sentient being (the one with the lowest level of well-being).
This is maximin-utilitarianism. However, according to many
people, both sum-utilitarianism and maximin-utilitarianism
have some counterintuitive implications. With sum-utilitarianism, it is morally good to sacrifice one individual in order to
increase the well-beings of others, or to kill one individual and
replace him with another sentient being, or to keep on breeding
sentient beings in order to increase the sum of well-being. The
latter is known as the “repugnant conclusion” (Parfit, 1984):
an overpopulated world with a trillion individuals with a wellbeing slightly above zero, might be better than a world with
only a thousand individuals who have a satisfying high level of
well-being. Our moral intuitions go against these conclusions.
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These conclusions can be avoided by introducing a level of risk
aversion.
Fact 3: There are many sentient being, and some beings can
be worse-off than others. This fact implies that from behind
the impartial veil of ignorance, how to maximize your wellbeing becomes a game of chance. Mathematically, sum-utilitarianism implies that the expectation value of your well-being
will be maximized. But you have to be aware that there is a
risk that you might be born as one of the worst-off individuals.
For example: two individuals might have well-beings equal to
10 and 100, so the expectation value will be equal to 55 (the
average). In sum-utilitarianism, this situation would be equal
to the situation where those two beings both have a well-being
of 55. The problem is that in the first situation, you might end
up as the person with level 10. When much is at stake, most
moral agents have a risk aversion (need for safety—to play it
safe), and in this game of chance, this means that they would
not opt for sum-utilitarianism, but to some kind of prioritarianism: giving priority to increases of well-being of the worst-off
positions. Therefore they prefer the second situation. If you
have maximum risk aversion (a maximum need for safety),
you would take the maximin-utilitarian strategy (maximizing the minimum/lowest well-being), giving all priority to the
worst-off position, because you are so worried at becoming this
worst-off individual. If you have zero risk aversion, you are a
sum-utilitarist. A high but not maximum level of risk aversion
would result in a prioritarianism that is in between maximinutilitarianism and sum-utilitarianism. We could call this ‘quasimaximin prioritarianism’.
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Moral intuition 3: A (high) level of risk aversion is good
(especially when much of your well-being is at stake; then most
people are risk averse).
Universal ethical principle 3: Quasi-maximin prioritarianism should be applied in all situations. Mathematically, this
principle can be expressed as the maximization of the expectation value of a weighted average of qualities of life of all
sentient beings. Let’s clarify this expression. The maximization
runs over all available choices from behind a veil of ignorance.
Each choice gives a different world-history. In each choice, we
only consider the sentient beings that exist in that world-history
(in the present or the future), and only those sentient-beings
whose well-being can be influenced by our choice. The expectation value is in case the outcomes of qualities of life are uncertain (then it becomes a double game of chance: first, from
behind the veil of ignorance you don’t know which one of the
possible beings you will be, and second, you don’t know exactly what qualities of life those possible beings will get). The
weighted average is over all sentient beings that exist in the
present or will exist in the future, whereby the lowest qualities
of life get the highest weight factors, resulting in a higher priority to maximize those lowest positions. So it is a priority averaged well-being that matters. (When the lowest position gets
the weight 1 and the others 0, then we obtain maximin-utilitarianism. When all qualities of life get an equal weight factor, we
arrive at sum-utilitarianism.) The quality of life refers to the total preferred well-being of an individual over his/her complete
lifespan. This preferred well-being is the value that one would
ascribe to living the complete life of that individual, when looking from the most impartial point of view, e.g. from behind a
veil of ignorance. The quality of life contains everything that
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would matter to you, all the preferences that you would have, if
you would live the life of that sentient being.
Quasi-maximin prioritarianism has some elegant features. It
avoids the abovementioned objections against sum-utilitarianism, and also a lot of objections against animal ethics. First,
consider the idea of painlessly killing someone (for example in
his sleep). From behind the veil of ignorance, you cannot prefer
such killing, even if you are not aware that you will be killed.
This means that a sentient being should now be defined as a being that has already developed the capacity to feel and has not
yet permanently lost this capacity. Indeed, quality of life starts
from the first feeling and ends at the last feeling.
Next, take the problem of replaceability. Is it allowed to kill
a sentient being (painlessly), and then let another sentient being be born? This happens when we breed and slaughter cows.
If we kill a sentient being, his quality of life will be e.g. 5,
whereas it would have been 10 otherwise (when he lives a full
life). So in a first option, one individual will have a life with
total well-being equal to 5, and a second one will have at most
level 10. In a second option, we will have only one being, with
level 10. From behind the veil of ignorance, in the first option
you have probability ½ to have a low quality of life equal to
5. In the second option, you are sure you will have level 10. A
sum-utilitarist would say that the first option is better, because
the total quality of life equals 15, which is higher than 10 in the
second situation. But being risk averse, I would prefer the second situation, and that’s also what our prioritarian theory says.
Therefore, sentient beings are not replaceable. Also the repugnant conclusion (the idea to keep on breeding sentient beings
until their qualities of life are about to drop below zero), can
be avoided, by simply noting that behind the veil of ignorance
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you would not prefer an overpopulated world where everyone
has a very low quality of life. So quasi-maximin prioritarianism avoids the often heard argument that breeding livestock
animals is good, because they owe their lives to the breeders,
and it is better to live a life on a farm than not to be born at all.
According to our prioritarianism, the choice is not between an
existing life on a farm versus a non-existing life, because as
said above: in each choice, we only consider the sentient beings
that exist in that world-history.
Another famous problem in animal ethics is the lifeboat dilemma (e.g. Regan, 1983). Suppose there are different sentient
beings in a lifeboat, but we cannot save everyone. Those beings can have different expected life expectancies, but they can
also differ in complexity (richness) of emotions, the amounts
of needs, the levels of satisfaction when needs are satisfied,…
This means that the potential qualities of life can differ amongst
the different sentient beings in the lifeboat. The potential qualities of life between a (mentally normal) human, a dog, or a
frog can differ. This influences our choices whom to rescue. As
Regan argued, it might be required to sacrifice the dogs first,
because they experience a less rich life than the humans. However, Regan said that the life of one human would trump the
lives of a million and more dogs. According to our prioritarianism (the veil of ignorance with a high but not maximum level of
risk aversion), there would be a number of dogs, above which
the loss of that amount of dogs would be worse than the loss of
one human life.
The quasi-maximin principle is coherent with a lot of our
moral intuitions. And there is a second way to arrive at this
principle.

© Between the Species, 2014

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 17, Issue 1

42
Stijn Bruers

Fact 4: There might be situations where we can decrease
someone’s well-being with a huge amount (drive him into extreme poverty) in order to increase the worst-off position with
a negligible small amount.
Moral intuition 4: Efficiency is important to some degree.
Empathy might have a tendency to give absolute priority to
improving the worst-off individual, which results in a maximin
strategy. But if we value efficiency, we would not sacrifice too
much well-being.
Universal ethical principle 4: This equals quasi-maximin
prioritarianism (principle 3). We should maximize the quality
of life of all sentient beings, giving a strong priority to increase
the lowest values of well-being. In other words: we should
maximize the quality of life of the worst off individuals, unless
this is at the expense of much more well-being of others.
In summary: a rational approach of impartiality (the veil of
ignorance) with a high but not maximum risk aversion (need for
safety) coheres with an emotional approach of empathy with a
low but non-zero need for efficiency. These are two approaches
resulting in the same quasi-maximin prioritarian principle.
This principle has two disadvantages. As a first problem,
the qualities of life are very difficult to measure and compare.
All we have is our empathy, our scientific knowledge, and our
imagination. We have to try placing ourselves in the position of
others, by using empathy, or by imagining that we could be the
other individual, with all his or her needs and feelings. So the
“emotional” method of empathy and the “rational” method of
the veil of ignorance are actually two rules of thumb to make
educated guesses about the order of the qualities of life of dif-
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ferent individuals. Empathy and imagination are virtues to be
developed and already allow us to move quite far.
A second disadvantage is that the level of priority given to
the worst-off (in other words: the level of risk aversion or the
need for efficiency), is in some sense arbitrary. The level is
somewhere between 0 (sum-utilitarianism with zero risk aversion) and 1 (maximin-utilitarianism with maximum risk aversion). However, I believe our coherent picture is strong enough
to withstand this objection. The arbitrariness is less worse than
overriding a coherent set of strong moral intuitions. The good
thing is that no-one has a strong preference to a sharp level of
priority. No-one says the value should be 0,748. It’s more like
a fuzzy range that we prefer. So we can and should be a bit
tolerant to the levels of priority that other moral agents would
prefer, and this means we can be flexible and could come to a
democratic or mutual consensus between all moral agents. But
once we have set a level of priority, we should apply it consistently in all relevantly similar cases.
The quasi-maximin prioritarianism is the basic framework
of a coherent ethical system of animal equality. All sentient
beings are in some sense equal from an impartial perspective
such as behind a veil of ignorance. It is a consequentialist ethic,
because it only looks at outcomes of qualities of life. Giving a
level of priority for the worst-off positions, some people (true
consequentialists) might prefer to stop the construction of a
coherent ethical system here. However, there are some more
intuitions that do not nicely fit in the prioritarian ethic. We first
discuss an intuition related to an ethic of care, and next an intuition related to an ethic of rights.
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Fact 5: There is a possible situation where I have to choose
between a sentient being I hold dear and one or more other unknown sentient beings, e.g., in a burning house dilemma, where
I have to choose between saving my child or other individuals
from the flames
Moral intuition 5: I am allowed to help the person I hold
dear.
Universal ethical principle 5: It is allowed to be partial in
all situations where someone is involved whom you hold dear
(with whom you have a personal relationship or strong feelings
of empathy), as long as we tolerate similar levels of partiality of
everyone else. This principle of tolerated partiality trumps the
above prioritarian principle to some degree, but not too much.
Burning house dilemmas such as “Your child or the dog?”
(Francione, 2000) are often used to counter animal equality.
But here we introduced a new principle of tolerated partiality,
which hides a new kind of equality. In the burning house, I
would save my child instead of someone else. But all individuals in the house are equal if I would tolerate your choice to save
someone else. A white racist would say that it is immoral to
save black children from the house instead of white children.
A speciesist would say that it is immoral to save someone belonging to another species. But if someone has an emotional
connection with a dog, we should tolerate his choice to save
the dog. Saving a dog instead of a human, saving a mentally
disabled orphan instead of a mentally normal child, or saving
your lover instead of two unknown persons, might be violations
of the quasi-maximin principle. But I think we are allowed to
violate this principle to some degree. Also here we could try
to reach a democratic or mutual consensus between all moral
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agents, about the degree of violation that is allowed. We should
apply this degree of partiality consistently in all situations.
Fact 6: The organ transplantation problem. There is a possible situation, where five patients in a hospital would die unless we sacrifice an innocent person against his will and use
five of his organs for transplantations. This would be allowed
according to prioritarianism.
Moral intuition 6: I (and most people) feel emotional distress and restraint to sacrifice this one person against his will.
We should not sacrifice someone, even if prioritarianism is violated and even if someone I hold dear is one of the patients in
the hospital. So this intuition trumps both prioritarianism and
tolerated partiality.
There are a lot of other moral dilemmas where we can use
someone without his/her consent as merely means to save others. Torturing someone in order to gain information about a
bomb, throwing someone (a sentient being such as a mentally
disabled human) in front of a trolley in order to block the trolley that is about to kill other people, using someone as a shield
against bullets, using someone as a slave, using someone in
medical experiments, terror bombing civilians in order to demoralize the enemy, raping someone, killing and eating someone (cannibalism), trafficking,… All these situations generate
moral intuitions that are very coherent if we translate them into
the following deontological principle (an extension of Kantian
ethics).
Universal ethical principle 6: All sentient beings have a
basic right not to be used as merely means to someone else’s
ends. A victim is used as merely means, when two conditions
are met. 1) A moral agent causes the victim a “disrespectful
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harm” against its will. A disrespectful harm means a treatment
as property or commodity (see Francione, 2000) or a violation
of bodily integrity. 2) The presence of the victim is required
in order to reach the ends. The latter is an important criterion
because there are moral dilemmas whereby you are allowed to
cause harm to someone in order to save others. In those dilemmas, the presence of the victim was not required in order to
save the others.
This principle is coherent with the notion of respect, which
is next to empathy an important moral virtue, and it is coherent
with the notion of intrinsic value (the opposite of instrumental
value) as well.
The ethical principle of the basic right trumps both the principle of priority and the principle of tolerated partiality. But the
basic right is not absolute: if the principle of priority is strongly
violated (if thousands of sentient beings will die), then a basic right might be violated (this corresponds with a need for
efficiency). As with the above principles, this level of violation can be determined on the basis of a democratic or mutual
consensus among moral agents. And here we have flexibility
as well: there are different levels of harm, there is a morally
relevant gradation in someone’s ends (from the vital needs of
many sentient beings to the luxury ends of one individual), and
there is a gradation in the level of sentience and mental capacities. These gradations could be coupled. For example: a being
with higher levels of morally relevant mental capacities has a
stronger claim to this basic right.
Let’s briefly apply this principle to the “least harm” objection against veganism (Davis, 2003). Suppose that a meat eater
can kill and eat one cow, whereas a vegan needs a crop field to
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get the same amount of nutrients. Suppose using that crop field
accidently kills five mice. The meat eater causes least harm,
but he violates the basic right of the cow, which is worse. The
mice are not used as merely means, so therefore veganism remains the morally better choice. (For further criticism on the
least harm argument of Davis, see Matheny, 2003, and Lamey,
2007).
We now arrive at an ethical system with three principles of
equality. The first is based on impartiality (interchangeability
of sentient beings) and results in a form of prioritarianism. The
second is a tolerated partiality, whereby we tolerate the choices
of others to save those they prefer. From this tolerated partiality, the individuals in a burning house inherit a “tolerated choice
equality.” This principle weakly trumps the first principle. The
third principle is a basic right equality, and this trumps the two
former principles to a strong but not absolute degree. The three
principles are related to respectively a consequentialist ethic of
well-being and justice, a feminist ethic of care, and a deontological ethic of rights.
These three principles imply veganism. Consider a dairy
cow in the livestock industry and a human who likes to eat
cheese. Start with the veil of ignorance. In one situation, dairy
cows are not bred, so we can only be a human being, who has
a quality of life equal to 10. In the second situation, this human
enjoys the cheese (his quality of life increases to 11), but the
cow has a miserable life (suffering in the livestock industry,
early death,…). So her quality of life equals 3. According to
quasi-maximin prioritarianism, the first situation is preferred.
If you’d choose the second situation, from behind the veil of
ignorance, you have probability ½ to end up in the worst-off
position. (According to sum-utilitarianism, the second situa-
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tion is better.) Tolerated partiality is also violated: if we prefer
the enjoyment of cheese above the use of the cow, we should
also tolerate the other option: breeding women and using their
breast milk to make cheese for cows (suppose the cow likes
human cheese). This we would not tolerate. The third principle
is also violated, because the cow in the livestock industry is
used as merely means (her bodily integrity is violated and she
is treated as property).
With these three principles, we arrive at a coherent system
that best fits our strongest moral intuitions. Some intuitions
based on speciesist judgments are not compatible with this system of animal equality. These intuitions are too weak and cannot be incorporated without introducing highly arbitrary and
artificial constructions, so we have to dismiss these speciesist
intuitions as being moral illusions. Although our theory implies veganism, it still allows for some partiality (the tolerated
partiality meets our intuitive preference for some individuals).
However, there is one serious problem remaining.
Fact 7: Predators need meat in order to survive. If predators
cannot use other sentient beings as merely means, they will all
become extinct. If principles 4, 5, and 6 were universalized to
predator animals, this would imply that they have to become
extinct.
Moral intuition 7: Predators are allowed to hunt and hence
violate the basic rights and well-being of prey. It would be a
tragedy if they became extinct. It is not easy to formulate a
clear principle that is coherent with this intuition as well as
with the intuitions that we encountered before. If we suppose
that biodiversity has a moral value, then we have the following
option.
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Universal ethical principle 7: If a sufficiently large group
of sentient beings became by an evolutionary process dependent on the use of other sentient beings for their survival, they
are allowed to use other sentient beings for that purpose (until
feasible alternatives, that don’t violate basic rights, are found).
If we suppose that biodiversity has moral (intrinsic) value,
and if we define biodiversity as the diversity of everything that
is the direct product of evolutionary processes, then this seventh principle becomes coherent with the value of biodiversity.
So predators and their behavior contribute to biodiversity and
we should not destroy that biodiversity.
This principle is also coherent with a “triple-N-principle,”
which refers to the three values “natural, normal and necessary” of a carnist ideology (Joy, 2009). This connection works
if we define natural as: behavior that is a direct consequence of
a process of evolution (genetic mutation and natural selection).
So it refers to an “evolutionary process.” Normal means that
the behavior happens a lot, so it refers to a “sufficiently large
group.” And necessary means that those beings would die if
they no longer exhibit that behavior. This refers to “dependency
for survival.”
Putting the three criteria together, natural+normal+necessary,
means that a lot of biodiversity would be lost when the behavior stopped. And a lot of biodiversity has a lot of moral value,
sufficiently enough to trump the basic right. Predation is normal, natural, and necessary, so it is allowed (as long as there are
no feasible alternatives), even if it violates the basic right. For
humans, eating animal products is not necessary (according to
the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics), so we are not allowed
to violate the basic rights of animals. Organ transplantation (by
sacrificing a sentient being against his will) is not allowed ei-
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ther, because it is a violation of the basic right and it is not
normal and natural (it is necessary though).
Note that this value-of-biodiversity principle is completely
unrelated to the value-of-sentience principles discussed before,
although we could compare biodiversity as an intrinsically
valuable property of ecosystems, with sentience as an intrinsically valuable property of sentient beings. In itself, the biodiversity principle seems arbitrary, but it is coherent with lots of
our intuitions. For example: moving around and killing insects
(by accident) is considered allowed, even if scientists are able
to demonstrate that insects are sentient. But the 3-N-principle
says that moving around is natural, normal, and necessary behavior of animals.
Finally, we also have situations where predators attack us
or beings that we hold dear. Our intuition say we are allowed
to defend ourselves and others, and we have a stronger duty to
protect some individuals with whom we have special relationships. All sentient beings have the right to defend themselves
or others, they have the right to be partial in such decisions, as
long as they respect similar kinds of partiality of others (see
principle 5) and as long as biodiversity is not threatened. If we
wish, we could also add that we have a duty to protect all beings
that have (or will develop) moral agency or rationality. Those
rational beings not only feel their interests, but they also know
and understand their interests. This rationality applies to most
human beings, except, for example, seriously mentally disabled
human orphans. This satisfies people’s intuitions that we have
a duty to protect humans from predators. (But if we say that
we have a duty to protect mentally disabled humans whereas
we do not have a duty to protect non-human animals, because
all humans have a higher moral status than non-humans, then
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we become too partial. This kind of speciesism, like racism or
sexism, is a kind of partiality and arbitrariness that we cannot
tolerate.)
This completes the process. We now have a theory of animal
equality, with clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fit our strongest moral intuitions, and without too
many arbitrary elements.
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